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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN CECALA,

Case No. 920592-CA
Priority No. 2

De fendant/Appe11ant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony,

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d)
Utah R. Evid. 403
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Is it error for the initial intentions of a person to be

i

proven by what he or she did at a point later in time, and was it
improperly prejudicial and misleading for the trial court to admit
such after-the-fact conduct in a case where the prosecution

<

acknowledged that such evidence could [improperly] sway the jury?1
See State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 29 n.ll (Utah 1993)
(while "an admissibility decision is the sum of several rulings, each

<

of which may be reviewed under a separate standard[,] . . . the
correctness standard is applied only to the trial court'& ultimate
conclusion to admit or exclude the proffered evidence. . . .

To the

<

foregoing extent, then, the statement in rState v. IRamirezr* 817
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),] that admissibility is always a question of law
is correct").

<

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
burglary (count I), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and theft (count II), a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d).

(R 100-01).

Following the jury's verdict, dated May 5, 1992, (R 90-92), the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis sentenced Mr. Benjamin Cecala to an

1
The issue stated another way is: "did the trial judge,
who initially held that no probative value attached to Mr. Cecala's
use of an alias, err in inconsistently finding probativeness in
hearsay testimony which claimed that Cecala had also used a false
name when such an allegation, even if true, occurred at a time after
the time at which his intent was at issue?
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indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison
on the first count (together with a $10,000 fine + 25% surcharge),
and a zero-to-five year term on the second count.

The terms ran

concurrently with commitment beginning forthwith.

(R 100-01).

Following the trial court proceedings, privately obtained
defense counsel (Mr. Steven McCaughey) moved to withdraw from the
case.

On October 27, 1992, the motion was granted and the Salt Lake

Legal Defender Ass'n was appointed to represent Mr. Cecala on
appeal.

(R 105-11).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 26, 1991, Johnny Torres, Reagan Bridgeforth, Clay

Reid, and Benjamin Cecala were seen looking at a white (Ford)
Bronco, marked with a "For Sale" sign and parked in front of Kim
White's residence (615 North 1400 West).

(R 291, 363). Johnny

Torres testified that after a short period of time, he and one of
the others walked up to the home to ask about the vehicle.

(R 377).

Torres knocked on the front door, received no answer, and returned
with his companion to the area in front of the house.

(R 377).

Johnny Torres then suggested burglarizing the residence
since no one appeared to be home.

(R 365).

Bridgeforth and Reid

readily agreed to the suggestion.

Benjamin Cecala, however, said he

wanted no part of it, a position acknowledged by Johnny Torres (who
was ultimately convicted for his involvement in the burglary).
(R 363, 365-67, 378, 381).
The parties dispute whether Cecala walked away at that
time, (R 378-79), or whether he remained in front of the house.
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i

(R 295).

Disagreement also exists as to whether all four persons

had initially walked together up to the house, (R 293), or whether
Benjamin had waited by the Bronco.

(R 377-78).

The parties do not dispute that Johnny Torres, Reagan
Bridgeforth, and Clay Reid jumped a fence (wall) and burglarized the
residence.

(R 367, 376, 381). After obtaining approximately $500

in cash and some property, those three individuals were seen fleeing
from the house as the police arrived.

(R 334, 340, 385). Benjamin

Cecala was found standing in a park, talking to some women.
(R 354). Dean Evans, the officer who arrested Mr. Cecala, admitted
that Benjamin was not seen running away from the scene.

(R 358).

Rick Clausing, a neighbor who lived across the street from
the White's residence, said that he watched Benjamin walk right by
the approaching police officers (Keith Bankhead and Dean Evans),
(R 302), and towards the nearby park.

Clausing and Bankhead

believed that Benjamin also walked towards an apartment complex and
knocked on some doors, (R 300-02, 335), although James Hallock, an
officer who had kept Mr. Cecala in sight for all but a few seconds,
said he did not observe such conduct.

(R 322).

Clausing acknowledged that he viewed the activities of
Torres, Bridgeforth, Reid, and Cecala as suspicious.

All four

individuals are Hispanic; three of them appeared to be juveniles.
(R 289).

Benjamin was seen wearing dark or black clothing.

Clausing told his wife to call the police.

(R 299).

Unlike Johnny Torres, who knew first-hand of Benjamin's
unwillingness to participate in the burglary, Rick Clausing based
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his suspicions on what he thought he saw occurring.

Clausing saw

Benjamin turn and talk to the others every two or three minutes.
(R 298).

Cecala may have even looked around and "peeked" in the

officer's direction.

(R 330).

Clausing confessed, however, that he did not hear Benjamin
make any noises or sounds when the police arrived.

(R 307).

Officer Bankhead similarly said nothing about any such occurrence in
his police report.

(R 343).

James Hallock, the officer who arrived

on the scene in the same patrol car as Bankhead, remained consistent
on this fact, making no mention of a sound in his police report or
in his testimony at trial.

(R 311-26).

In apparent contradiction

of what had actually occurred, officer Bankhead claimed for the
first time at trial that he heard a "howl" or an "owl" sound.
(R 332) . However, Bankhead acknowledged that he did not know who
had made the sound and that any of the four persons could have made
it.

(R 339).
After the other three persons were seen running from the

scene, Torres and Reid were immediately apprehended; Bridgeforth
escaped; and Benjamin Cecala was arrested in the park.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in admitting evidence that
Mr. Benjamin Cecala had used a false name.

Whatever Benjamin may or

may not have been thinking at the time his friends burglarized a
home cannot be established by what Benjamin said or did after the
fact.
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The jury, however, may have viewed the improperly admitted
testimony as reflective of Mr. Cecala's intent, or his knowledge, or
his participation.

^

In other words, the after the fact evidence may

have misled or confused the jury when the proper focus should have
been on what his intent was at the time the others committed the
burglary.

^

As the prosecutor acknowledged, the testimony in question

affected the jury's determination of Mr. Cecala's "role."
<

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING "AFTER THE FACT"
EVIDENCE, CONDUCT WHICH HAD NO BEARING ON A PERSON'S
INTENT "BEFOREHAND" OR "DURING" THE INCIDENT, AND
CONDUCT WHICH MISLED THE JURY IN ITS DELIBERATION
Excerpted below are relevant parts of Mr. Cecala's motion

<

to exclude any references to a false name:
i
MR. MCCAUGHEY [Counsel for Benjamin Cecala]: Your
Honor, my understanding is the prosecution is going to
call a witness who would testify that Mr. Cecala, when
apprehended, gave a false name, a name that was not
his.
i
I have previously mentioned to the court before we
started this trial that I had a motion in limine which
I wanted the court to hear. The basis of that motion
in limine, to exclude any reference to a false name
given by Mr. Cecala, and the basis of that was that
it's, any probative value that that evidence had, or
has, is far outweighed by the prejudiciality that
would be shown to the defendant.
My understanding is that the court is going to deny
that motion, at least as far as the initial false name
that Mr. Cecala gave, but is going to sustain the
motion as to any other false names. My position is
that the court should keep everything out, because I
think it's under Rule 403, the prejudiciality.
THE COURT: Everything, or everything concern[ing] the
alleged giving of the false name?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 6

-

i

^

<

MR. MCCAUGHEY: Everything under the giving of the
false name under Rule 403.
THE COURT: Let me clarify before Mr. Jones is given
an opportunity to respond. You brought this to my
attention this morning in chambers. Mr. Jones was
present as well. You did not ask for a formal hearing
at that time.
MR. MCCAUGHEY:
THE COURT:

That is correct.

Mr. Jones, your response?

MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I just think that the
evidence concerning the defendant giving a false name
is certainly consistent with the element of guilt by
the defendant. You have a situation where the
officers are called, some of them take off and run,
the defendant doesn't run away, but he appears to be
peeking around the corner. He walks away from the
officers.
I just think his lying to the officer about who he
is and his identity is certainly something that the
jury should be able to consider in the case in trying
to determine his role, if any, in this particular
crime.
THE COURT: So you're saying it goes to an assessment
of his intent?
MR. JONES:

Yes, I think so.

THE COURT:

And his participation?

MR. JONES:

And knowledge of the crime.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, it's my understanding from the
side bar conference that you had alluded to three
false names that were given to law enforcement by the
defendant; is that correct?
MR. JONES: Well, I'm not sure all three are false,
but originally he gives the name of Salvador Sanchez,
and then the officers discover that's not his name,
and when they confront him with that he then gives
them the name of Bennie Medina, and they come back and
say, "That's not your name," and he finally gives them
the name of Benjamin Cecala. So I guess there are
three changes in his name.
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THE COURT: There doesn't appear to be much question
that the first name is not the defendant's correct
name; is that right, Mr. McCaughey?
MR. MCCAUGHEY: That's right. He goes by the second,
too, because I think Medina, he uses both Medina and
Cecala. Because his father's name is Medina but his
mother's name is now Cecala.
THE COURT: That appears consistent with what I would
have ruled in any event, and now it becomes even
clearer, and that is, Mr. Jones, I am going to allow
you to go into the giving of a false name, to wit, the
first name that was given.
I am going to ask you to direct your witnesses not
to allude to the other names having been given by the
defendant, or referring to him in any way as aliases
or anything else. I don't think that that is
probative. I think the single giving of a name that
is contrary to the accurate name is probative.
I think that whatever prejudicial effect it has, if
any, is far outweighed by the probative value of the
same. I can't see any prejudicial effect, I can see a
clear probative value to this, and particularly I
think we're not looking at a prejudicial effect, if
it's limited in the manner I indicated.
Mr. Jones, I'll ask you to clearly discuss that
over the break with your witnesses.
MR. JONES:
THE COURT:

All right, I will.
Is there anything further, Mr. McCaughey?

MR. MCCAUGHEY: My only argument, just so the records'
clear, I think the prejudice we have is the fact that
a person charged with a crime and is on trial is shown
to have lied to the police officers. And I think that
is prejudicial. I mean the court may not think it's
overwhelming prejudicial, but I do think some
prejudice results from the jury hearing that he lied
to a police officer.
THE COURT: I think your point is well taken. What
I'm saying is the prejudicial effect, if any, is
outweighed by the probative value. And to the extent
that this gets to the defendant's credibility, I think
it becomes highly relevant and probative. So you've
articulated yet another basis for my ruling.
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But as to the the alleged aliases, they are not to
come in. And you know, it's kind of like the old
Groucho Marx "You Bet Your Life" show here the little
birdie comes down. I don't want to hear it. If I see
the bird coming down with the witness referring to
this, I'm going to be mad.
So talk to your witnesses and make it very clear to
them just what they can say and just what they cannot
say. Tell them if there's any doubt in their mind
about what's appropriate an what is not, they're to
stop and ask for an opportunity to confer with you,
Mr. Jones. I don't want to run the risk of a mistrial
at this juncture.
(R 345-49).
Despite the prosecutor's argument that a lie (after the
fact to an investigating officer) goes to an assessment of "intent,"
"knowledge," and "participation," (R 346-47), the Utah Supreme Court
has found to the contrary.

In State v. Bolsinqer# 699 P.2d 1214

(Utah 1985), the Court concluded that such after the fact conduct
was not relevant to John Bolsinger's state of mind at the time of
the alleged occurrence.
In Bolsinger, the State charged John Bolsinger with the
depraved indifference murder of Kaysie Sorensen.

The two apparently

had been drinking on the night in question and later engaged in
consensual sexual intercourse.

In an unusual variation of the act

(the details of which are not important to the case at bar), Kaysie
died by strangulation.
For present purposes, however, the Bolsinger Court made an
important distinction between what happened before or during the act
and what occurred afterwards.

After the strangulation, John

Bolsinger "dumped the contents of [Kaysie's] purse and left the
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<

apartment with the stereo."
addition,

Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1216.

In

lf

[a]t trial [Bolsinger] explained that he had lied to the

police in his taped confession."

.Id. at 1216.

*

Nevertheless, our

supreme court held:

I
The evidence here simply does not support a finding
of depravity in the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of Kaysie. The jury may well have
been swayed by the reprehensible conduct of the
defendant subseguent to her death. But that conduct
is not before us for review. The evidence is
undisputed that Kaysie was dead when defendant rose
from the bed. He himself covered her face with a
sheet, a universal gesture acknowledging death. At
that moment the conduct which subjected him to a
charge of criminal homicide came to an end.
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220-21 (emphasis added by the Court).
The Court did not view Bolsinger's after the fact conduct
or his admitted lie as probative to determining what his intent was
at the time of the incident.

Id*

at

1220-21.

In fact, the Court

held that the State had failed to prove the reguisite mens rea for
the second degree depraved indifference murder charge.2

699 P.2d

at 1220-21.

2
While the Court held that there was insufficient
evidence for the depraved indifference murder charge (mens rea not
proven), State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)
(Howe, J., joined by Durham, J.); id. (Stewart, J., concurring [on
this point] and dissenting [in principle on the decided
disposition]), the Court found sufficient evidence of intent for a
manslaughter conviction. Id. at 1219 (Bolsinger "was aware of, but
consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable
risk . . . " ) . However, in analyzing the element of intent under
either depraved murder or manslaughter, Bolsinger's after the fact
conduct proved irrelevant to his mens rea at the time of the
offense. See id. at 1215-21 (the Court did not even infer intent
from the evidence).
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Even if a false name was in fact given here by Mr. Cecala,
such conduct was far less "reprehensible" than defendant Bolsinger's
actions.

Conduct after the fact may be challenged separately, butf

as the Bolsinger Court determined, such conduct should not be used
to improperly sway the jury.

It is irrelevant to determining what a

person had intended at the time of the alleged occurrence.

Cf.

State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 495 n.13 (Utah App. 1991) (another
after the fact consideration, "flight," is an inadequate basis for
creating an articulable suspicion for a stop").
Nor did the Bolsinger court view the defendant's admitted
lies or his taking of Kaysie's property as being important to a
credibility determination.

However, the opinion did note that such

evidence "may well have swayed" the jury.
at 1221.

See Bolsinger, 699 P.2d

The inherent prejudice could not be ignored.
Similarly, here, the prejudicial effect of the improperly

admitted evidence is perhaps best acknowledged by the prosecutor
himself.

As the prosecutor suggested and as the trial court hinted,

there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Cecala's use of a false
name could have been used by the jury to determine his intent, his
participation, and his knowledge in the matter (thereby confusing
the issues and misleading the jury):
MR. JONES [the prosecutor]: . . . I just think his
lying to the officer about who he is and his identity
is certainly something that the jury should be able to
consider in the case in trying to determine his role,
if any, in this particular crime.
THE COURT: So you're saying it goes to an assessment
of his intent?
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MR. JONES:

Yes, I think so.

THE COURT:

And his participation?

MR. JONES:

And knowledge of the crime.

*

(R 346-47).

I
The above concessions appear ample in terms of the
prejudicial effect that the after the fact evidence had on the
jury.

Utah R. Evid. 403.

whole was tenuous at best.

In addition, however, the evidence as a
The parties do not dispute that Benjamin

Cecala did not enter the residence.
of the property in question.

Mr. Cecala also possessed none

The only issue is whether he acted as

a "lookout" for the others.
The neighbor, Rick Clausing, believed that Benjamin turned
and talked to the others every two or three minutes as he stood in
i
front of the house.

(R 298).

Officer Bankhead thought he saw

Cecala "peeking" in his direction when the officers approached.
(R 330) . However, neither action constituted criminal conduct and
such behavior was merely reflective of someone who had just been
told that others were going to commit a burglary.

Cf. State v.

Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987) (in a case where
"suspicious" conduct did not justify a stop, this Court reasoned in
part, "The subsequent 'nervous' conduct on the part of the [suspect]
when approached by Officer Beesley is consistent with innocent as
well as with criminal behavior").
Officer Bankhead testified for the first time at trial that
he heard a "howl" or an "owl" sound, (R 332), although Bankhead
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acknowledged that he did not know who made the sound and that any of
the four suspects could have made it.

(R 339).

Curiously, though,

in his police report officer Bankhead never mentioned such a sound,
(R 343), and both the other officer on the scene (James Hallock, who
arrived at the same time and in the same patrol car as Bankhead,)
and the neighbor who lived across the street (Rick Clausing) said
nothing about the alleged noise.

(R 307, 311-26).

In any event, even if the sound occurred, officer
Bankhead's own testimony reflected that the State did not carry its
burden of establishing which of the four persons, if any, made the
noise.

(R 339); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Although Torres may have told Cecala about the burglary,

Benjamin's actions reflected nothing more than a desire to avoid the
police.

If, as Rick Clausing believed, (R 300-02), Benjamin went

first to the neighboring apartments (a belief not shared by officer
Hallock despite keeping Mr. Cecala in his sight for all but a few
seconds, [R 322]), the fact remains that thereafter Benjamin walked
right by the approaching officers towards the park.

(R 302).

The

arresting officer did not see Benjamin running or fleeing from the
scene, but only observed him standing and talking to some women in
the park.

(R 358).

Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471

(1963) (acting surprised or avoiding the police does not amount to
"specific and articulable facts11); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489,
494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721, 722
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Defendant's "behavior which, taken for
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its most insidious implications, indicated only that he wanted to
avoid police, and could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that

(

he was engaged in criminal activity")); Talbot, 792 P.2d at 489
(flight is an inadequate basis for creating a reasonable
(

suspicion).
Benjamin Cecala may have known what was about to occur but
the evidence as a whole revealed nothing more than his initial
association with the other three individuals.

But see State v.

<

Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) ("The mere fact that [a
suspect] was with [another] does not necessarily conjoin her actions
with his"); State v. Salasf 830 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991).

While

\

the four persons may have associated initially together in front of
the house, Benjamin Cecala's conduct after being told about the
burglary reflected his desire not to be involved; he was nervous

(

because of what he had been told; and he was simply unwilling to
converse with the police. Under the present circumstances, the
improperly admitted evidence cannot be considered harmless.

I

CONCLUSION
Mr. Benjamin Cecala respectfully requests that this Court
(

reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

itf

day of May, 1993.

RONALD S. FPJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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•~ treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.

76-6-202. Burglary(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value, is> substa^SS?ygoutweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice>. < « * » » » * * £ »
sues or misleacling
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste ot
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